sCompile: Critical Path Identification and Analysis for Smart Contracts by Chang, Jialiang et al.
sCompile: Critical Path Identification and Analysis
for Smart Contracts
Jialiang Chang∗, Bo Gao†, Hao Xiao†, Jun Sun† and Zijiang Yang∗
∗Department of Computer Science
Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI, USA
Email: {jialiang.chang‖zijiang.yang}@wmich.edu
†Pillar of Information System Technology and Design
Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore
Email: bo gao@mymail.sutd.edu.sg, {hao xiao‖sunjun}@sutd.edu.sg
Abstract—Smart contracts are an innovation built on top of the
blockchain technology. It provides a platform for automatically
executing contracts in an anonymous, distributed, and trusted
way, which has the potential to revolutionize many industries. The
most popular programming language for creating smart contracts
is called Solidity, which is supported by Ethereum. Like ordinary
programs, Solidity programs may contain vulnerabilities, which
potentially lead to attacks. The problem is magnified by the
fact that smart contracts, unlike ordinary programs, cannot be
patched easily once deployed. It is thus important that smart
contracts are checked against potential vulnerabilities.
Existing approaches tackle the problem by developing methods
which aim to automatically analyze or verify smart contracts.
Such approaches often results in false alarms or poor scalability,
fundamentally because Solidity is Turing-complete. In this work,
we propose an alternative approach to automatically identify
critical program paths (with multiple function calls including
inter-contract function calls) in a smart contract, rank the paths
according to their criticalness, discard them if they are infeasible
or otherwise present them with user friendly warnings for user
inspection. We identify paths which involve monetary transaction
as critical paths, and prioritize those which potentially violate im-
portant properties. For scalability, symbolic execution techniques
are only applied to top ranked critical paths. Our approach has
been implemented in a tool called sCompile, which has been
applied to 36,099 smart contracts. The experiment results show
that sCompile is efficient, i.e., 5 seconds on average for one smart
contract. Furthermore, we show that many known vulnerability
can be captured if the user inspects as few as 10 program
paths generated by sCompile. Lastly, sCompile discovered 224
unknown vulnerabilities with a false positive rate of 15.4% before
user inspection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Built on top of cryptographic algorithms [1], [2], [3] and the
blockchain technology [4], [5], [6], cryptocurrency like Bitcoin
has been developing rapidly in recent years. Many believe that
it has the potential to revolutionize the banking industry by
allowing monetary transactions in an anonymous, distributed,
and trusted way. Smart contracts bring it one step further
by providing a framework which allows any contract (not
only monetary transactions) to be executed in an autonomous,
distributed, and trusted way. Smart contracts thus may rev-
olutionize many industries. Ethereum [7], an open-source,
blockchain-based cryptocurrency, is the first to integrate the
functionality of smart contracts. Due to its enormous potential,
its market cap reached at $45.13 billion as of Nov 28th,
2017 [8].
In essence, smart contracts are computer programs which
are automatically executed on a distributed blockchain in-
frastructure. Popular applications of smart contracts include
crowd fund raising and online gambling, which often involve
monetary transactions as part of the contract. Majority of smart
contracts in Ethereum are written in a programming language
called Solidity. Like ordinary programs, Solidity programs
may contain vulnerabilities, which potentially lead to attacks.
The problem is magnified by the fact that smart contracts,
unlike ordinary programs, cannot be patched easily once they
are deployed on the blockchain.
In recent years, there have been an increasing number
of news reports on attacks targeting smart contracts. These
attacks exploit security vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart con-
tracts and often result in monetary loss. One notorious example
is the DAO attack, i.e., an attacker stole more than 3.5 million
Ether (equivalent to about $45 million USD at the time) from
the DAO contract on June 17, 2017. This attack is carried
out through a bug in the DAO contract. The correctness and
systematic analysis and verification of smart contracts since
then have been brought into sight with urgency.
There have been multiple attempts on building tools which
aim to analyze smart contracts fully automatically. For in-
stance, Oyente [9] applies symbolic execution techniques to
find potential security vulnerabilities in Solidity smart con-
tracts. Oyente has reportedly been applied to 19,366 Ethereum
contracts and 45.6% of them are flagged as vulnerable. An-
other example is Zeus [10], which applies abstract interpreta-
tion to analyze smart contracts and claims that 94.6% of the
contracts are vulnerable. In addition, there are approaches on
applying theorem proving techniques to verify smart contracts
which requires considerable manual effort [11].
The problem of analyzing and verifying smart contracts is
far from being solved. Some believe that it will never be, just
as the verification problem of traditional programs. Solidity
is designed to be Turing-complete which intuitively means
that it is very expressive and flexible. The price to pay is
that almost all interesting problems associated with checking
whether a smart contract is vulnerable are undecidable [12].
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Consequently, tools which aim to analyze smart contracts
automatically either are not scalable or produce many false
alarms. For instance, Oyente [9] is designed to check whether
a program path leads to a vulnerability or not using a constraint
solver to check whether the path is feasible or not. Due to the
limitation of constraint solving techniques, if Oyente is unable
to determine whether the path is feasible or not, the choice is
either to ignore the path (which may result in a false negative,
i.e., a vulnerability is missed) or to report an alarm (which
may result in a false alarm).
In this work, we develop an alternative approach for ana-
lyzing smart contracts. On one hand, we believe that manual
inspection is unavoidable given the expressiveness of Solidity.
On the other hand, given that smart contracts often enclose
many behaviors (which manifest through different program
paths), manually inspecting every program path is simply
overwhelming. Thus, our goal is to reduce the manual effort
by identifying a small number of critical program paths and
presenting them to the user with easy-to-digest information.
Towards this goal, we make the following contributions in
this work.
1) We develop a tool called sCompile. Given a smart con-
tract, sCompile constructs a control flow graph (CFG)
which captures all possible control flow including those
due to the inter-contract function calls. Based on the
CFG, we can systematically generate program paths
which are constituted by a bounded sequence of function
calls.
2) As the number of program paths are often huge, sCom-
pile then statically identifies paths which are ‘critical’.
In this work, we define paths which involve monetary
transaction as critical paths. Focusing on such paths
allows us to “follow the money”, which is often sufficient
in capturing vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
3) Afterwards, to prioritize the program paths, sCompile an-
alyze each path to see whether it potentially violates
certain critical property. We define a set of (configurable)
money-related properties based on existing vulnerabil-
ities. After the analysis, sCompile ranks the paths by
computing a criticalness score for each path. The crit-
icalness score is calculated using a formula which takes
into account what properties the path potentially violates
and its length (so that a shorter path is more likely to be
presented for user inspection).
4) Next, for each program path which has a criticalness
score larger than a threshold, sCompile automatically
checks whether it is feasible using symbolic execution
techniques. The idea is to automatically filter those in-
feasible ones (if possible) to reduce user effort.
5) Lastly, the remaining critical paths are presented to the
user for inspection through an interactive user interface.
sCompile is implemented in C++ and has been applied
systematically to 36,099 smart contracts which are gathered
from EtherScan [13]. Our experiment results show that sCom-
pile can efficiently analyze smart contracts, i.e., it spends 5
seconds on average to analyze a smart contract (with a bound
on the number of function calls 3 including calls through inter-
contract function calls). This is mainly because sCompile is
designed to rank the program paths based on static analysis
and only applies symbolic execution to critical paths, which
significantly reduces the number of times symbolic execution
is applied. Furthermore, we show that sCompile effectively
prioritizes programs paths which reveal vulnerabilities in the
smart contracts, i.e., it is often sufficient to capture the vulner-
ability by inspecting the reported 10 or fewer critical program
paths. Lastly, using sCompile, we identify 224 vulnerabilities.
The false positive rate of the identified property-violating paths
(before they are presented to the user for inspection) is kept to
an acceptable 15.4%. We further conduct a user study which
shows that with sCompile’s help, users are more likely to
identify vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II il-
lustrates how sCompile works through a few simple examples.
Section III presents the details of our approach step-by-step.
Section IV shows evaluation results on sCompile. Section V
reviews related work and lastly Section VI concludes with a
discussion on future work.
II. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
In this section, we present multiple examples to illustrate
vulnerabilities in smart contracts and how sCompile helps to
reveal them. The contracts are shown in Fig. 1.
Example 1: Contract EnjinBuyer is a token managing con-
tract. It has 2 inherent addresses for developer and sale. In
function purchase tokens(), the balance is sent to the sale’s
address. There is a mistake on the sale’s address and as a result
the balance is sent to a non-existing address and is lost forever.
Note that any hexadecimal string of length not greater than
40 is considered a valid (well-formed) address in Ethereum
and thus there is no error when function purchase tokens() is
executed.
Given this contract, the most critical program path reported
by sCompile is one which invokes function purchase tokens().
The program path is labeled with a message stating that
the address does not exist on Ethereum mainnet. With this
information, the user captures the vulnerability.
Example 2: Contract toyDAO is a simple contract which has
the same problem of the DAO contract. Mapping credit is a
map which records a user’s credit amount. Function donate()
allows a user to top up its credit with 100 wei (which is a
unit of Ether). Function withdraw() by design sends 20 wei
to the message sender (at line 1) and then updates credit.
However, when line 1 is executed, the message sender could
call function withdraw() through its fallback function, before
line 2 is executed. Line 1 is then executed again and another
20 wei is sent to the message sender. Eventually, all Ether in
the wallet of this contract is sent to the message sender.
In sCompile, inspired by common practice in banking
industry, users are allowed to set a limit on the amount
contract EnjinBuyer {
address public developer =
0x0639C169D9265Ca4B4DEce693764CdA8ea5F3882;
address public sale =
0xc4740f71323129669424d1Ae06c42AEE99da30e;
function purchase_tokens() {
require(msg.sender == developer);
contract_eth_value = this.balance;
require(sale.call.value(contract_eth_value)());
require(this.balance==0);
}
}
contract toyDAO{
address owner;
mapping (address => uint) credit;
function toyDAO() payable public {
owner = msg.sender;
}
function donate() payable public{
credit[msg.sender] = 100;
}
function withdraw() public {
0 uint256 value = 20;
1 if (msg.sender.call.value(value)()) {
2 credit[msg.sender] = credit[msg.sender] - value;
}
}
}
contract Bitway is ERC20 {
function () public payable {
createTokens();
}
function createTokens() public payable {
require(msg.value > 300);
...
}
...
}
Fig. 1: Illustrative contracts
transferred out of the wallet of the contract. Assume that the
user sets the limit to be 30. Given the contract, a critical
program path reported by sCompile is one which executes line
0, 1, 0, and 1. The program path is associated with a warning
message stating that the accumulated amount transferred
along the path is more than the limit. With this information,
the user is able to capture the vulnerability. We remark that
existing approaches often check such vulnerability through
a property called reentrancy, which often results in false
alarms [9], [10].
Example 3: Contract Bitway is another token management
contract. It receives Ether (i.e., cryptocurrency in Ethereum)
through function createTokens(). Note that this is possible be-
cause function createTokens() is declared as payable. However,
there is no function in the contract which can send Ether
out. Given this contract, sCompile identifies a list of critical
program paths for user inspection. The most critical one is
a program path where function createTokens() is invoked.
Furthermore, it is labeled with a warning message stating that
the smart contract appears to be a “black hole” contract as
there is no program path for sending Ether out, whereas this
program path allows one to transfer Ether into the wallet of
the contract. By inspecting this program path and the warning
message, the user can capture the vulnerability. In comparison,
existing tools like Oyente [9] and MAIAN [14] report no
vulnerability given the contract. We remark that even although
MAIAN is designed to check similar vulnerability, it checks
whether a contract can receive Ether through testing1 and thus
results in a false negative in this case.
III. APPROACH
In this section, we present the details of our approach step-
by-step. Fig. 2 shows the overall work flow of sCompile.
There are six main steps. Firstly, given a smart contract, sCom-
pile construct a control flow graph (CFG) [15], based on which
we can systematically enumerate all program paths. Secondly,
we identify the monetary paths based on the CFG up to a
user-defined bound on the number of function calls. Thirdly,
we analyze each program path in order to check whether it
potentially violates any of the pre-defined monetary properties.
Next, we compute a criticalness score for each program and
rank the paths accordingly. Afterwards, we apply symbolic
execution to filter infeasible critical program paths. Lastly, we
present the results along with the associated program paths to
the user for inspection.
A. Constructing CFG
Given a smart contract, the first step of sCompile is to con-
struct the CFG. The CFG must capture all possible program
paths. sCompile constructs the CFG based on the compiled
EVM opcode. Note that in the compiled opcode, there is a
unique location for the first instruction to be executed and
there is a unique location for every function in the contract.
Formally, a CFG is a tuple (N, root, E) such that
• N is a set of nodes. Each node represents a basic block
of opcodes (i.e., a sequence of opcode instructions which
do not branch).
• root ∈ N is the first basic block of opcodes.
• E ⊆ N ×N is a set of edges. An edge (n, n′) is in E if
and only if there exists a control flow from n to n′.
For simplicity, we skip the details on how E is precisely
defined and refer the readers to the formal semantics of EVM
in [7]. In order to support inter-contract function calls, when
a CALL instruction calls a foreign function defined in an
unknown third-party contract, we assume that the foreign
function may in turn call any function defined in current
function2. Note that this assumption includes the case of
calling the fallback function in third-party contract.
For instance, Fig. 3 shows the CFG of the contract toyDAO
shown in Fig. 1. Each node in Fig. 3 represents a basic block
with a name in the form of Node m n, where m is the index
of the first opcode of the basic block and n is the index of
the last. In Fig. 3, the red diamond node at the top is the
root node; the blue rectangle nodes represent the first node
of a function. For example, Node 102 109 is the first node
of function donate(). Note that a black oval represents a node
1MAIAN sends a value of 256 wei to the contract deployed in the private
blockchain network
2The return value from a call to a foreign function is marked as symbolic
during symbolic execution.
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Fig. 3: Control flow graph of the contract toyDAO
which contains a CALL instruction and thus the node can be
redirected to the root due to inter-contract function calls. We
use different lines to represent different edges in Fig. 3. The
black solid edges represent the normal control flow. The red
dashed edges represent control flow due to a new function
call, e.g., the edge from Node 88 91 to Node 0 12. That is,
for every node n such that n ends with a terminating opcode
instruction (i.e., STOP, RETURN), we introduce an edge from
n to root. The red dotted edges represent control flow due
to the inter-contract function call. That is, for every node
which ends with a CALL instruction to an external function,
an edge is added from the node to the root, e.g., the edge from
Node 112 162 to Node 0 12.
Given a bound b on the number of function calls, we can
systematically unfold the CFG so as to obtain all program
paths during which only b or fewer functions are called. For
instance, with a bound 2, the set of program paths include all
of those which visit Node 81 87 or Node 102 109 no more
than twice.
Statically constructing the CFG is non-trivial due to indirect
jumps in the bytecode generated by the Solidity compiler. For
instance, part of the bytecode for contract toyDAO is shown
as follows.
........... | .......
92 JUMPDEST | 300 SHA3
93 PUSH2 0x0064 // 100 | 301 DUP2
96 PUSH2 0x0070 // 112 | 303 SSTORE
99 JUMP | 304 POP
|
100 JUMPDEST | 305 JUMPDEST
101 STOP | 306 POP
....... | 307 JUMP
112 JUMPDEST | ........
113 PUSH1 0x00 |
115 PUSH1 0x14 |
....... |
The Solidity compiler applies templates to translate a
Solidly program statements to EVM bytecode and often in-
troduces indirect jumps. In the above example, The JUMP
at line 99 is a direct jump because its target is pushed as
a constant value (0x70) by the PUSH2 instruction at line 96.
The instruction JUMP at line 307 is an indirect jump because
the target of JUMP is the top entry of the stack when execution
reaches line 307. The content of the stack however cannot be
determined simply by scanning the preceding instructions. In
fact, the target address is pushed into the stack by the PUSH2
instruction at line 93.
We thus use the following steps to construct CFG from
EVM opcode:
1) Disassemble the bytecode to a sequence of opcode in-
structions.
2) Construct basic blocks from the opcode instructions (such
that each basic block is a node in the CFG).
3) Connect basic blocks with edges (including but not limit
to direct jumps) which can be statically decided from the
opcode instructions.
4) Use stack simulation to complete the CFG with edges for
indirect jumps.
In step 1, we use the disassembly utility provided by Solid-
ity compiler to convert the bytecode to a human readable
sequence of opcode instructions. In step 2, we break the
opcode instructions into basic blocks such that all instructions
inside a basic block execute sequentially (e.g., the basic
block Node 92 99). The boundaries between basic blocks
are determined by the following instructions: branching in-
structions JUMP and JUMPI, JUMPDEST which denote the
start of a basic block (the entry basic block starts at address
0 which is not a JUMPDEST instruction), and CALL whose
next instruction denotes a start of a new basic block, and
terminal instructions such as RETURN, STOP, and REVERT
which denote the end of a terminating basic block (e.g., the
basic block Node 100 101).
The terminal instructions do not have a successor block and
a basic block which ends with a CALL has two successor.
One is the basic block whose first instruction is the next
instruction of the CALL instruction in the instruction sequence.
The other is the entry basic block because of the assumption
about a CALL instruction. One successor of instruction JUMPI
is the basic block which starts with the next instruction of the
JUMPI.
The target address of JUMP and of the other successor
of JUMPI are stored in the top stack entry when execution
reaches JUMP and JUMPI. In most of the cases, the top stack
entry is pushed in as a constant value by the PUSH instruction
proceeding it (a.k.a. a direct jump). Thus the successor block
can be determined statically by checking the constant value of
the PUSH instruction.
For indirect jumps, the target of JUMP may be pushed by
an instruction far away from the JUMP instruction and thus
cannot be decided by checking the proceeding instructions.
Thus after step 3, the basic blocks which end with an indirect
jump have missing edges to their successors and we call
these basic blocks as dangling blocks (e.g., the basic block
Node 305 307) and some basic blocks may not be reachable
from the entry basic block due to the dangling blocks (e.g.,
the basic block Node 100 101).
We use stack simulation to find the successor of dangling
basic blocks. Stack simulation is similar to define-use analysis
except that dangling blocks which are reachable from the
entry basic block are processed first. First, we find all the
paths from the entry block to the dangling blocks (e.g., there
are two paths from entry block Node 0 12 to the dangling
block Node 305 307) and simulate the instructions in each
path following the semantics of the instruction on the stack.
Note that a dangling block ends with JUMP may have multiple
successors in the CFG. When we reach the JUMP or JUMPI
in the dangling block, the content of the top stack entry shall
be determined and we connect the dangling block with the
block which starts at the address as in the top stack entry. For
instance, for the dangling block Node 305 307, there is only
one successor Node 100 101 in both paths which is pushed
by the instruction at address 093. We repeat the above step
until all dangling blocks are processed.
B. Identifying Monetary Paths
Given a bound b on the number of call depth (i.e., the
number of function calls) and a bound on the loop iterations,
there could be still many paths in the CFG to be analyzed. For
instance, there are 6 program paths in the toyDAO contract
with a call depth bound of 1 (and a a loop bound of 5)
and 1296 with a call depth bound of 4. This is known as
the path explosion problem [16]. Examining every one of
them, either automatically or manually, is likely infeasible.
Thus, it is important that we focus on the important ones. In
this work, we focus mostly on the program paths which are
money-related. The reason is although there are a variety of
vulnerabilities [17], almost all of them are ‘money’-related as
attackers often target vulnerability in the smart contracts for
monetary gain.
To systematically identify money-related program paths, we
label the nodes in the CFG with a flag indicating whether it is
money related or not. A node is money-related if and only if its
basic block contains any of the following opcode instructions:
CALL, CREATE, DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT. In
general, one of these opcode instructions must be used when
Ether is transferred from one account to another. A program
path which traverses through a money-related node is consid-
ered money-related. Note that each opcode instruction in EVM
is associated with some gas consumption which technically
makes them money-related. However, the gas consumption
alone in most cases does not constitute vulnerabilities and
therefore we do not consider them money-related.
For instance, given the CFG of toyDAO shown in Fig. 3,
Node 112 162 contains a CALL instruction, implementing
statement msg.sender.call.value(value)(), and
thus is money-related. Any path that traverses through
Node 112 162 is a money-related path. In Fig. 3, we visualize
money-related nodes with black background.
Focusing on money-related paths allows us to reduce the
number of path to analyze. For instance, the number of paths
is reduced from 6 to 2 with a bound 1 and it is reduced from
1296 to 116 such paths with a bound 4.
C. Identifying Property-Violating Paths
After the previous step, we are left with a set of important
program paths. To prioritize the program paths for user
inspection, we proceed to analyze these paths in order to
check whether critical properties are potentially violated or
not. The objective is to prioritize those program paths which
may trigger violation of critical properties for user inspection.
In the following, we introduce some of the properties that
we focus on in detail and discuss the rest briefly. We remark
that these properties are designed based on previously known
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the properties can be configured
and extended in sCompile.
Property: Respect the Limit In sCompile, we allow users to
set a limit on the amount of Ether transferred out of the
contract’s wallet. This is inspired by common practice applied
in banking systems. For each program path, we statically check
whether Ether is transferred out of the wallet and whether the
transferred amount is potentially beyond the limit. That is, for
each program path which transfers Ether, we use a symbolic
variable to simulate the remaining limit, which is initialized
to be the limit. Each time an amount is transferred out, we
decrease the variable by the same amount. Afterwards, we
check whether the remaining limit (i.e., a symbolic expression)
is less than zero. If it is, we conclude that the program path
potentially violates the property. Note that if we are unable
to determine the exact amount to be transferred (e.g., it may
depend on the user input), we conservatively assume the limit
may be broken.
For instance, assume that the limit is set to be 30wei for
the toyDAO contract shown in Fig. 1, the following path is
reported to exceed the transfer limit: Node 0 12 → · · · →
Node 112 162 → Node 0 12 → · · · → Node 112 162.
Initially, the limit has value 30 (i.e., the assumed user-set
limit). Each time Node 112 162 is executed, its value is
reduced by 20. Thus, its value becomes negative after the
second time.
Property: Avoid Non-Existing Addresses Any hexadecimal
string of length no greater than 40 is considered a valid (well-
formed) address in Ethereum. If a non-existing address is used
as the receiver of a transfer, the Solidity compiler does not
generate any warning and the contract can be deployed on
Ethereum successfully. If a transfer to a non-existing address
is executed, Ethereum automatically registers a new address
(after padding 0s in front of the address so that its length
becomes 160bits). Because this address is owned by nobody,
no one can withdraw the Ether in it since no one has the
private key.
For every program path which contains instruction CALL
or SELFDESTRUCT, sCompile checks whether the address
in the instruction exists or not. This is done with the help of
EtherScan, which is a block explorer, search, API and analytic
platform for Ethereum [13]. Given an address, EtherScan
makes use of the public ledger of Ethereum, and returns true
if it is registered (i.e., the address has come to effect with
a cost of 25,000wei for this account, and there is at least
one transaction history record). Otherwise, returns false. A
program path which sends Ether to a non-existing address
is considered to be violating the property. There are 2 types
of transactions to register an address in Ethereum: external
transactions which are initiated by an external account and
internal transaction which are initiated by other contracts
through function calls to the address. Most of the addresses are
registered by external transactions. To minimize the number
of requests to EtherScan, we only query external transactions,
thus may lead to false positives when the address has only
internal transactions.
For instance, in the contract EnjinBuyer shown in Fig. 1,
address sale is less than 160 bits (due to omitting the last
4 bits). sCompile checks the validity of the address sale in
a program path which calls function purchase tokens() and
warns the user that it is not an existing address. As a result,
the user can capture such mistakes.
Property: Guard Suicide sCompile checks whether a pro-
gram path would result in destructing the contract without
constraints on the date or block number, or the contract
ownership. A contract may be designed to “suicide” after
contract StandardToken is Token {
1 function destroycontract(address _to) {
2 require(now > start + 10 days);
3 require(msg.sender != 0);
4 selfdestruct(_to);
5 }
6 ...
7 }
8 contract Problematic is StandardToken { ... }
Fig. 4: Guardless suicide
certain date or reaching certain number of blocks, and often
by transferring the Ether in the contract wallet to the owner. If
however a program path which executes the opcode instruction
SELFDESTRUCT can be executed without constraints on the
date or block number, or the contract ownership, the contract
can be destructed arbitrarily and the Ether in the wallet can be
transferred to anyone. A famous example is Parity Wallet [18]
which resulted in an estimated loss of tokens worthy of $155
million [19].
We thus check whether there exists a program path which
executes SELFDESTRUCT and whether its path condition is
constituted with constraints on date or block number and
contract owner address. While checking the former is straight-
forward, checking the latter is achieved by checking whether
the path contains constraints on instruction TIMESTAMP or
BLOCK, and checking whether the path condition compares
the variables representing the contract owner address with
other addresses. A program path which calls SELFDESTRUCT
without such constraints is considered a violation of the
property.
One example of such vulnerability is the Problematic
contract3 shown in Fig. 4. Contract Problematic inherits
contract StandardToken, which provides basic functionalities
of a standard token. One of the functions in StandardToken is
destroycontract(), which allows one to destruct the contract.
sCompile reports a program path which executes line 4
potentially violates the property.
Property: Be No Black Hole In a few cases, sCompile an-
alyzes program paths which do not contain CALL, CREATE,
DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT. For instance, if a con-
tract has no money-related paths (i.e., never sends any Ether
out), sCompile then checks whether there exists a program
path which allows the contract to receive Ether. The idea is to
check whether the contract acts like a black hole for Ether. If
it does, it is considered a vulnerability.
To check whether the contract can receive Ether, we check
whether there is a payable function. Since Solidity version
0.4.x, a contract is allowed to receive Ether only if one of its
public functions is declared with the keyword payable. When
the Solidity compiler compiles a non-payable function, the
following sequence of opcode instructions are inserted before
the function body
1 CALLVALUE
3We hide the names of the contracts as some of them are yet to be fixed.
2 ISZERO
3 PUSH XX
4 JUMPI
5 PUSH1 0x00
6 DUP1
7 REVERT
At line 1, the instruction CALLVALUE retrieves the message
value (to be received). Instruction ISZERO then checks if
the value is zero, if it is zero, it jumps (through the JUMPI
instruction at line 4) to the address which is pushed into
stack by the instruction at line 3; or it goes to the block
starting at line 5, which reverts the transaction (by instruction
REVERT at line 7). Thus, to check whether the contract is
allowed to receive Ether, we go through every program path
to check whether it contains the above-mentioned sequence of
instructions. If all of them do, we conclude that the contract is
not allowed to receive Ether. Otherwise, it is. If the contract
can receive Ether but cannot send any out, we identify the
program path for receiving Ether as potentially violating the
property and label it with a warning messaging stating that the
contract is a black hole.
For instance, given contract Bitway shown in Fig. 1, the
program path corresponding to a call of function approve()
contains the following sequence of instructions.
0305 JUMPDEST
0306 CALLVALUE //get the msg.value
0307 ISZERO
0308 PUSH2 013c //if msg.value is 0, go to line 316
0311 JUMPI
0312 PUSH1 00
0314 DUP1
0315 REVERT
0316 JUMPDEST //start of main block
As a comparison, the program path corresponding to a call
of function createTokens() does not contain the sequence of
instructions. At the same time, there is no instruction like
CALL, CREATE, DELEGATECALL and SELFDESTRUCT in
its EVM code to send Ether out, so the contract Bitway is a
contract which receives Ether but never sends any out.
We have presented above a few built-in properties supported
by sCompile. These properties are designed based on reported
vulnerabilities. sCompile is designed to be extensible, i.e., new
properties can be easily supported by providing a function
which takes a program path as input and reports whether the
property is violated or not.
To further help users understand program paths of a smart
contract, sCompile supports additional analysis. For instance,
sCompile provides analysis of gas consumption of program
paths. Gas is the price for executing any part of a contract.
It helps to defend against network abuse as execution of
any EVM bytecode instruction consumes a certain amount
of gas. To execute a normal transaction successfully, enough
gas must be provided; otherwise the transaction will fail and
the consumed gas will be forfeited. For every transaction,
Ethereum estimates the amount of gas to be consumed by
the transaction based on concrete transaction inputs provided
by the user. However, without trying out all possible inputs,
users of the contract may not be aware of the existence
TABLE I: Definition of αpr
transfer limit non-existing addr. suicide black hole
Likelihood 1 1 2 3
Severity 2 3 3 2
Difficulty 2 2 3 2
αpr 4 6 18 12
of certain particularly gas consuming program paths. Given
a contract, sCompile estimates the gas consumption of all
program paths found by symbolic execution and then output
the maximum gas consumption of corresponding path(s). The
gas consumption of a program path is estimated based on each
opcode instruction in the program path statically.
D. Ranking Program Paths
So far we have identified a number of program paths, some
of which potentially violates certain properties. To allow user
to focus on the most critical program paths as well as to
save the effort on applying heavy analysis techniques like
symbolic execution on these program paths, we prioritize
the program paths according to the likelihood they reveal
critical vulnerability in the contract. For each program path, we
calculate a criticalness score and then rank the program paths
according to the scores. The criticalness score is calculated
using the following formula: let pa be a program path and V
be the set of properties which p violates.
criticalness(pa) =
Σpr∈V αpr
 ∗ length(pa)
where αpr is a constant which denotes the criticalness of
violating property pr, length(pa) is the length of path pa
(i.e., the number of function calls) and  is a positive constant.
Intuitively, the criticalness is designed such that the more
critical a property the program path violates, the larger the
score is; and the more properties it violates, the larger the
score is. Furthermore, it penalizes long program paths so that
short program paths are presented first for user inspection.
Note that a program path may violate multiple properties. For
instance, a path which transfers all Ethers to an non-existing
account before destructing the contract violates property of
non-existing address as well as property on guardless suicide.
To assess the criticalness of each property, we use the tech-
nique called failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA [20])
which is a risk management tool widely used in a variety of
industries. FMEA evaluates each property with 3 factors, i.e.,
Likelihood, Severity and Difficulty. Each factor is a value rating
from 1 to 3, i.e., 3 for Likelihood means the most likely; 3
for Severity means the most severe and 3 for Difficulty means
the most difficult to detect. The criticalness αpr is then set
as the product of the three factors. After ranking the program
paths according to their criticalness score, only program paths
which have a criticalness score more than certain threshold
are subject to further analysis. This allows us to reduce the
program paths significantly.
In order to identify the threshold for criticalness, we adapt
the k-fold cross-validation[21], [22] idea in statistical area.
contract GigsToken {
1 function createTokens() payable {
2 require(msg.value > 0);
3 uint256 tokens = msg.value.mul(RATE);
4 balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender].add(tokens);
5 owner.transfer(msg.value);
6 }
7 ...
}
Fig. 5: A non-greedy contract
We collected a large set of smart contracts and split them
into a training data set(10,452 contracts) and a test data set
(25,678 contracts). The training data set is used to tune the
parameters required for computing the criticalness, e.g., value
of  and the threshold for criticalness score. We repeated the
experiments 20 times which took more than 5,700 total hours
of all machines and optimizes those parameters (based on the
number of vulnerability discovered and the false positive rate
of each property). The parameters adapted for each property
as shown in Table I, and  is set to be 1 and the threshold for
criticalness is set to be 10.
E. Feasibility Checking
After the last step, we have identified a ranked list of highly
critical program paths which potentially reveal vulnerability
in the smart contract. Not all the program paths are however
feasible. To avoid false alarms, in this step, we filter infeasible
program paths through symbolic execution.
Symbolic execution [23], [24] is a well-established method
for program analysis. It has been applied to solve a number of
software engineering tasks. The basic idea is to symbolically
execute a given program, e.g., use symbolic variables instead
of concrete values to represent the program inputs and main-
tain the constraints that a program path must satisfy in order to
traverse along the path, and lastly solve the constraint using a
constraint solver in order to check whether the program path
is feasible or not. Symbolic execution has been previously
applied to Solidity programs in Oyente [9] and MAIAN [14].
In this work, we apply symbolic execution to reduce the
program paths which are to be presented for users’ inspection.
Only if a program path is found to be infeasible by symbolic
execution, we remove it. In comparison, both Oyente and
MAIAN aim to fully automatically analyze smart contracts and
thus when a program path cannot be determined by symbolic
execution, the result may be a false positive or negative.
For instance, Fig. 5 shows a contract which is capable of
both receiving (since the function is payable) and sending
Ether (due to owner.transfer(msg.value) at line 5), and thus
sCompile does not flag it to be a black hole contract. MAIAN
however claims that it is. A closer investigation reveals that
because MAIAN has trouble in solving the path condition for
reaching line 5, and thus mistakenly assumes that the path is
infeasible. As a result, it believes that there is no way Ethers
can be sent out and thus the contract is a black hole.
F. User Inspection
The last step of our approach is to present the analysis
results for user inspection. For user’s convenience, we im-
plemented a graphical user interface (GUI) in sCompile. The
GUI is not limited to display the final analysis results. For the
first step, user could open a smart contract in GUI by either
open or copy/paste the source code of smart contract. User
has the options to customize various parameters used in the
analysis, i.e., the bound on the call depth, the transfer limit,
the bound on loop iteration, the threshold for the criticalness
and the criticalness of various properties. After the analysis,
the output to the user consists of mainly two parts, i.e., one
part on statistical data and the other on detailed path data. For
the statistical data, a report is displayed which shows the total
execution time, the number of symbolic analyzed path and the
number of warnings for each properties that are discussed in
section III-C. For the path data, the top ranked critical paths
(which have a criticalness more than the threshold and are
not proved infeasible by symbolic execution) are shown to
user in the form of function call sequences. That is, for each
critical program path, we map it back to a sequence of function
calls by identifying the basic blocks in the sequence which
represent the start of a function. Furthermore, if the constraint
solver is able to solve the path condition, concrete function
parameters are used. Each critical path is associated with a
warning message which explains why the program path should
be inspected by the user. e.g., a potential violation of a critical
property or being particularly gas-consuming. User can click
on a specific path and the part of code which are associated
with the path is highlighted in the source code.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
A. Implementation
sCompile is implemented in C++ with about 8K lines of
code. The source code is available online4. The symbolic
execution engine in sCompile is built based on the Z3 SMT
solver [25]. Note that we also symbolically execute the con-
structor in the contract and use the resultant symbolic states as
the initial states for symbolic execution of all other functions
in the contract.
B. Experiment
In the following, we evaluate sCompile to answer research
questions (RQ) regarding sCompile’s efficiency, effectiveness
and usefulness in practice. Our test subjects contain all 36,099
contracts (including both the training set and the set) with
Solidity source code which are downloaded from EtherScan.
Although sCompile can also take EVM code as input, we ap-
ply sCompile to Solidity source code so that we can manually
inspect the experiment results.
All experiment results reported below are obtained on
a machine running on Amazon EC2 C3 xlarge instance
type with Ubuntu 16.04 and gcc version 5.4.0. The detailed
hardware configuration is: 2.8 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2680 v2
4The link is removed for anonymity.
TABLE II: Execution time of sCompile vs. Oyente vs. MAIAN
sCompile
(call bound = 1
sCompile
(call bound = 2)
sCompile
(call bound = 3) Oyente
MAIAN
(Suicidal)
MAIAN
(Prodigal)
MAIAN
(Greedy)
median 3.106 8.717 5.267 18.015 19.053 23.472 19.397
#timeout 1145 1737 2597 2223 1561 6186 1081
TABLE III: Loop bound definitions among three tools
Tool call bound loop bound timeout other bound
sCompile 3 5 60 s 60 cfg nodes
Oyente 1 10 60 s N.A.
MAIAN 3 (no inter-contract) N.A. 60 s 60 cfg nodes
processor, 7.5 GB ram, 2 x 40 GB SSD. The timeout set for
sCompile is: global wall time is 60 seconds and Z3 solver
timeout is 100 milliseconds. Furthermore, the limit on the
maximum number of blocks for a single path is set to be 60,
and the limit on the maximum iterations of loops is set to be
5, i.e., each loop is unfolded at most five times.
RQ1: Is sCompile efficient enough for practical usage? sCom-
pile is designed to be an addon toolkit for Solidity compiler
and thus it is important that sCompile is able to provide timely
feedback to users when a smart contract is implemented and
compiled. In this experiment, we evaluate sCompile in terms
of its execution time. We systematically apply sCompile to all
the benchmark programs in the training set (which includes all
the contracts in EtherScan as of January 2018) and measure
the execution time (including all steps in our approach).
The results are summarized in Table II and Fig. 6. In Ta-
ble II, the second, third and fourth column show the execution
of sCompile with call depth bound 1, 2, and 3 respectively,
so that we observe the effect of different call depth bounds.
For baseline comparison, the fifth column shows the execution
time of Oyente (the latest version 0.2.7) with the same timeout.
We remark that the comparison should be taken with a grain
of salt. Oyente does not consider sequences of function calls,
i.e., its bound on function calls is 1. Furthermore, it does
not consider initialization of variables in the constructor (or
in the contract itself). The next columns show the execution
time of MAIAN (the latest commit version on Mar 19).
Although MAIAN is designed to analyze program paths with
multiple (by default, 3) function calls, it does not consider
the possibility of a third-party contract calling any function
in the contract through inter-contract function calls and thus
often explores much fewer program paths than sCompile.
Furthermore, MAIAN checks only one of the three properties
(i.e., suicidal, prodigal and greedy) each time. Thus, we must
run MAIAN three times to check all three properties. The
different bounds used in all three tools are summarized in
Table III.
In Table II, the second row shows the median execution
time and the third row shows the number of times the
execution time exceeds the global wall time (60 seconds).
We observe that sCompile almost always finishes its analysis
within 10 second. Furthermore, the execution time remains
TABLE IV: Comparison on vulnerable contracts
sCompile MAIAN
alarmed true positive false positive alarmed true positive false positive
Avoid non-existing address 37 32 5 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Be no black hole 57 57 0 141 56 85
Guard Suicide 42 38 4 66 30 36
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MAIAN
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MAIAN
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Fig. 7: execution time on sCompile vs. Oyente vs. MAIAN,
with 60s global timeout, 100ms z3 solver timeout and bound
1.
unlike in the case of Oyente and MAIAN. To validate the
conjecture, we count the average number of program paths
which are analyzed through symbolic execution in sCompile.
Table V shows the results. The second column shows the
estimated total number of program paths on average for each
smart contract which is successfully tested within the wall time
limit. Note that the estimation is based on the CFG and thus
may count program paths which are infeasible. This is part
of the reason it is often greater than the number reported by
alternative methods like [8], [10]. The other part is that our
CFG is more complete by considering a more conservative
inter-procedural calls. The third column shows the average
number of paths analyzed with symbolic execution. It can be
observed that only a small fraction of the program paths are
symbolically analyzed. Furthermore, the number of symboli-
cally executed paths remain small even when the call depth
bound is increased. This is because only the top ranked critical
program paths are analyzed by symbolic execution. If there
are multiple program paths which potentially violate the same
property, sCompile prioritizes the shorter one and often avoids
symbolically executing the longer one. The results confirm our
conjecture.
TABLE V: Average number of program paths
in total symbolic-executed to user
call depth 1 48.92 37.51 1.49
call depth 2 6177.21 144.24 12.46
call depth 3 31346.62 121.23 12.62
In the second experiment, we aim to investigate the
effectiveness of sCompile. We manually inspect the critical
paths reported by sCompile to check whether the program
path, together with the associated warning message, reveals a
true vulnerability in the contract. Note that not all properties
checked by sCompile readily signals a vulnerability. For
instance, given a user-set transfer limit, sCompile may report
that a program path may violate the transfer limit. Although
such information is often useful, depending on the transfer
limit set by the user, the program path may or may not
signal a vulnerability. For instance, a gambling contract may
allow a user to place a bet with certain amount and transfer
some amount back to the user when the betting result is
revealed. In such a case, the transfer limit is likely broken
if a large bet is placed by the user. For another instance,
sCompile automatically reports a program path which is the
most gas-consuming. Such information is useful for the user
(e.g., to set the right ‘price’ for the transaction). It however
does not necessarily signal a vulnerability (although it may
signal program bugs). We thus focus on those results produced
by sCompile which are directly related to vulnerabilities in
the following, i.e., program paths which are deemed to violate
property “avoid non-existing addresses”, “be no black hole”
and “guard suicide”. Note that two of the properties (i.e., the
latter two) analyzed by sCompile are supported by MAIAN as
well. We can thus compare sCompile’s performance with that
of MAIAN for these two properties. The results are shown
in Table IV. In the following, we discuss the detailed findings.
For Property 2: Be no Black Hole, there are 57 contracts
alarmed by sCompile. We manually checked all these contracts
and confirm that they are all true positives. In comparison,
MAIAN identified 141 black hole contracts and 56 contracts
among them are true positives, 43 of which overlap with
sCompile’s results. We then investigate why sCompile missed
the remaining 13 contracts identified by MAIAN. We dis-
covered all of them took more than 60 seconds and thus
sCompile timed out before finishing analyzing. When we set
the timeout to 200s, sCompile successfully identifies 3 more as
black hole contracts. But the other 10 are stopped by contracts
with mass of money-related paths which leads to timeout at
last.
Fig. 6: Execution time of sCompile vs. Oyente vs. MAIAN
similar with different call depth bounds. This is largely due to
sCompile’s strategy on applying symbolic execution only to
a small number of top ranked critical prog am paths. We d
however observe that the nu ber of timeouts increases with an
increased call depth bound. A close investigation shows that
this is mainly because the number of program paths extracted
from CFG is much larger and it takes more time to extract
all paths for ranking. In comparison, although Oyente has a
call depth bound of 1, it times out on more contracts and
spends more time on average. MAIAN spends more time on
each property than the total execution of sCompile. For some
prope ty (such s Greedy), MAIAN times out fewer times,
which is mainly because it does not cons der inter-contr ct
function c lls and thus works with a smaller CFG.
Fig. 6 visualizes the distribution of execution time of
the tools. The horizontal-axis represents the execution time
(in seconds). Five numbers are used to construct each row:
min, lower quartile, median, upper quartile and max. The
leftmost and rightm st vertical lin s r presents the minimal
and the maxim m respectiv ly. For ach box, The leftmo
and rightmost vertical line represents the lower quartile (i.e.,
the median of the lower half 1/4) and upper quartile value
(i.e., the median of the upper half 3/4). The middle vertical
line inside the box is the median value. Based on the data, we
conclude that sCompile is efficient.
TABLE IV: Comparison on vulnerable contracts
sCompile MAIAN
alarmed true positive false positive alarmed true positive false positive
Avoid non-existing address 37 32 5 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Be no black hole 57 57 0 141 56 85
Guard suicide 42 38 4 66 30 36
TABLE V: Average number of program paths
in total symbolic-executed to user
call depth 1 48.92 37.51 1.49
call depth 2 6177.21 144.24 12.46
call depth 3 31346.62 121.23 12.62
We conjecture that the main reason that sCompile can
efficiently analyze smart contracts is that heavy techniques
like symbolic execution are applied only to the most critical
program paths in sCompile. To validate the conjecture, we
count the average number of program paths which are analyzed
through symbolic execution in sCompile. Table V shows the
results. The second column shows the estimated total number
of program paths on average for each smart contract which is
successfully analyzed. Note that the estimation is based on the
CFG and thus may count program paths which are infeasible.
This is part of the reason it is often greater than the number
reported by alternative methods like [9], [14]. The other part is
that our CFG is more complete. The third column shows the
average number of paths analyzed with symbolic execution.
It can be observed that only a small fraction of the program
paths are symbolically analyzed. Furthermore, the number of
symbolically executed paths remain small even when the call
depth bound is increased. This is because only the top ranked
critical program paths are analyzed by symbolic execution.
If there are multiple program paths which potentially violate
the same property, sCompile prioritizes the shorter one and
often avoids symbolically executing the longer one. The results
confirm our conjecture.
In the second experiment, we aim to investigate the
effectiveness of sCompile. We apply sCompile to all 36,099
contracts and manually inspect the critical paths reported by
sCompile to check whether the program path, together with
the associated warning message, reveals a true vulnerability
in the contract. Note that not all properties checked by
sCompile readily signals a vulnerability. For instance, given
a user-set transfer limit, sCompile may report that a program
path violates the transfer limit. Although such information is
often useful, depending on the transfer limit set by the user,
the program path may or may not signal a vulnerability. For
instance, a gambling contract may allow a user to place a
bet with certain amount and transfer some amount back to
the user when the betting result is revealed. In such a case,
the transfer limit is likely broken if a large bet is placed
by the user. For another instance, sCompile automatically
reports a program path which is the most gas-consuming.
Such information is useful for the user (e.g., to set the right
‘price’ for the transaction). It however does not necessarily
signal a vulnerability (although it may signal program bugs).
We thus focus on those results produced by sCompile which
are directly related to vulnerabilities in the following, i.e.,
program paths which are deemed to violate property “avoid
non-existing addresses”, “be no black hole” and “guard
suicide”. Note that two of the properties (i.e., the latter two)
analyzed by sCompile are supported by MAIAN as well.
We can thus compare sCompile’s performance with that of
MAIAN for these two properties. The results are shown
in Table IV. In the following, we discuss the detailed findings5.
For Property: Be no Black Hole, there are 57 contracts in the
training set are marked vulnerable by sCompile. We manually
checked all these contracts and confirm that they are all true
positives. In comparison, MAIAN identified 141 black hole
contracts and 56 contracts among them are true positives, 43
of which overlap with sCompile’s results. We then investigate
why sCompile missed the remaining 13 contracts identified by
MAIAN. We discovered all of them took more than 60 seconds
and thus sCompile timed out before finishing analyzing. When
we set the timeout to 200s, sCompile identifies 3 more as black
hole contracts.
The other 85 identified by MAIAN are false positives. Our
investigation reveals that 62 of them are library contracts.
Because MAIAN does not differentiate library contracts from
normal contracts, it marks all library contracts as vulnerable.
We randomly choose 5 contracts from the remaining for
further investigation. We find Z3 could not finish solving the
path condition in time and thus MAIAN conservatively marks
the contract as vulnerable. After extending the time limit for
Z3 and the total timeout, 4 of the 5 false positives are still
reported. The reason is that these contracts can only send
Ether out after certain period, and MAIAN could not find a
feasible path to send Ether out for such cases, and mistakenly
flags the contract as a black hole.
For Property: Guard Suicide, sCompile reports a program path
if it leads to SELFDESTRUCT, without a constraint on the
ownership of the contract or the date or the block number,
i.e., a guard to prevent an unauthorized users from killing the
contract. Among the analyzed contracts, sCompile identified
42 contracts which contain at least one program path which
violates the property. Many of the identified contracts violate
the property due to contract inheritance as shown in Fig. 4.
5We have informed all developers whose contact info are available about the
vulnerabilities in their contracts and several have confirmed the vulnerabilities
and deployed new contracts to substitute the vulnerable ones. Some are yet
to respond, although the balance in their contracts are typically small.
contract ViewTokenMintage{
1 modifier auth {
2 require(isAuthorized(msg.sender, msg.sig));
3 _;
4 }
5 function isAuthorized(address src, bytes4 sig)
internal view returns (bool) {
6 if (src == address(this)) {
7 return true;
8 } else if (src == owner) {
9 return true;
10 } else if (authority == DSAuthority(0)) {
11 return false;
12 } else {
13 return authority.canCall(src, this, sig);
14 }
15 }
16 function destruct(address addr) public auth {
17 selfdestruct(addr);
18 }
}
Fig. 7: False positive on guardless suicide by sCompile
contract MiCarsToken {
function killContract () payable external {
if (msg.sender==owner ||
msg.value >=howManyEtherInWeiToKillContract)
selfdestruct(owner);
}
...
}
Fig. 8: Ambiguous cases between sCompile and MAIAN
The remaining 4 cases reported by sCompile are false
positives. We manually investigate them one by one. We find
in one case, the contract is set up such that only the sender
of original transaction can trigger SELFDESTRUCT. This is
rather uncommon way of coding. The other 3 false alarms are
from the same contract ViewTokenMintage shown in Fig. 7.
The guard of selfdestruct depends on the return value of
function isAuthorized(). The path going through line 6 returns
true only if the msg.sender is the same as the current contract.
sCompile mistakenly reports the alarm as the ADDRESS is
symbolized as a symbolic constant.
Different from sCompile, MAIAN only checks whether a
contract can be destructed without any constraints except an
ownership constraint. MAIAN identified 66 contracts violating
the property. 30 of them are true positives, 13 of which are also
identified by sCompile. The other 36 are false positives. The
contract MiCarsToken shown in Fig. 8 shows a typical false
alarm. There are 2 constraints before SELFDESTRUCT in the
contract. sCompile considers such a contract safe for there
is a guard of msg.sender == owner (or the other condition),
whereas MAIAN reports a vulnerability as the contract can
also be killed if the msg.sender is not the owner when the
second condition is satisfied.
We further analyzed the 17 cases which were neglected
by sCompile. 6 of them are alarmed for owner change as
exemplified in Fig. 9. In this contract, selfdestruct is well
guarded, but the developer makes a mistake so that the
contract Mortal {
address public owner;
function mortal() { owner = msg.sender; }
function kill() {
if (msg.sender == owner) suicide(owner); }
}
Fig. 9: Contract of owner change
constructor becomes a normal function, and anyone can
invoke mortal() to make himself the owner of this contract
and kill the contract.
For Property: Avoid Non-existing Address, as demonstrated
by contract EnjinBuyer in Fig. 1, it is a problem if a wrong
address is used. For the contracts in the training set, all
addresses identified are of length 160 bits. However, there
are 37 contracts identified as non-existing addresses (i.e.,
not registered in Ethereum mainnet). These non-existing
addresses may be used for different reasons. For example,
in contract AmbrosusSale, the address of TREASURY does
not exist before the function specialPurchase() or
processPurchase() is invoked. As a result, it costs
more gas for a user who is the first to invoke those 2
functions because account registration costs at least additional
25, 000wei, which the user may not be aware of. There are 5
addresses from 5 contracts which are registered by internal
transactions.
We further analyzed 25,647 contracts newly uploaded in
EtherScan from February 2018 to July 2018. For “Be no
Black Hole”, there are 109 vulnerabilities out of 139 alarms
generated by sCompile. Applying MAIAN on these contracts,
84 of them are marked vulnerable, 77 of which are true
vulnerabilities overlapping with those found by sCompile and
7 library contracts are marked vulnerable mistakenly. Among
the 139 contracts, 25 vulnerable ones are missed by MAIAN
according to our manual check. For “Guard Suicide”, there are
83 vulnerabilities out of 114 alarms generated by sCompile.
Applying MAIAN on these contracts, 42 are marked vulner-
able, all of which overlap with those found by sCompile. For
“Avoid Non-existing Addresses”, there are 80 vulnerabilities
out of 87 alarms generated by sCompile. The 7 false alarms
are due to internal transactions.
In total, sCompile identifies 224 new vulnerabilities from
the 36,099 contracts consisting of 46 Black Hole vulnerabili-
ties, 66 Guardless Suicide vulnerabilities and 112 Non-existing
Address vulnerabilities.
RQ3: Is sCompile useful to contract users? Different from
other tools which aim to fully automatically analyze smart
contracts, sCompile is designed to facilitate human users. We
thus conduct a user study to see whether sCompile is helpful
for users to detect vulnerabilities.
The user study takes the form of an online test. Once a
user starts the test, first the user is briefed with necessary
TABLE VI: Statistics and results of surveyed contracts
Contract LOC #paths Q1 Q2 Time Usefulness
C1 (w) 33 8 7/8 3/8 119
5
C2 (w) 52 16 7/8 2/8 98
C3 (w) 67 38 7/8 2/8 233
C4 (w/o) 87 59 2/8 1/8 414
C5 (w/o) 103 13 3/8 1/8 397
C6 (w/o) 107 27 4/8 1/8 420
background on smart contract vulnerabilities (with examples).
Then, 6 smart contracts (selected at random each time from a
pool of contracts) are displayed one by one. For each contract,
the source code is first shown. Afterwards, the user is asked to
analyze the contract and answer the two questions. The first
question asks what is the vulnerability that the contract has.
The second question requires user to identify the most gas
consuming path in the contract (with one function call).
For the first three contracts, the outputs from sCompile are
shown alongside the contract source code as a hint to the
user. For the remaining 3 contracts, the hints are not shown.
The contracts are randomized so that not the same contracts
are always displayed with the hint. The goal is to check
whether users can identify the vulnerabilities correctly and
more efficiently with sCompile’s results.
We distribute the test through social networks and online
professional forums. We also distribute it through personal
contacts who we know have some experience with Solidity
smart contracts. In three weeks we collected 48 successful
responses to the contracts (without junk answers)6. Table VI
summarizes the results. Recall that sCompile’s results are
presented for the first three contracts. Column LOC and #paths
shows the number of lines and program paths in each contract.
Note that in order to keep the test manageable, we are limited
to relatively small contracts in this study. Columns Q1 and Q2
show the number of correct responses (the numerator) out of
the number of valid responses (the denominator). We collect
the time (in seconds) taken by each user in the Time column
to answer all the questions. In the end of the survey we ask
the user to give us a score (on the scale of 1 to 7, the higher
the score the more useful our tool is) on how useful the hints
in helping them answer the questions. The value in column
Usefulness is the average score over all responses because all
responses are shown half the hints.
The results show that for the first three contracts for which
sCompile’s analysis results are shown, almost all users are
able to answer Q1 correctly using less time. For the last
three contracts without the hints, most of the users cannot
identify the vulnerability correctly and it takes more time for
them to answer the question. For identifying the most gas-
consuming path, even with the hints on which function takes
the most gas, most of the users find it difficult in answering
the question, although with sCompile’s help, more users are
able to answer the question correctly. The results show that gas
6There are about 80 people who tried the test. Most of the respondents
however leave the test after the first question, which perhaps evidences the
difficulty in analyzing smart contracts.
consumption is not a well-understood problem and highlight
the necessity of reporting the condition under which maximum
gas consumption happens. All the users think our tool is useful
(average score is 5/7) in helping them identify the problems.
V. RELATED WORK
sCompile is related to work on identifying vulnerabilities
in smart contracts. Existing work can be roughly categorized
into 3 groups according to the level at which the vulnera-
bility resides at: Solidity-level, EVM-level, and blockchain-
level [17], [26]. In addition, existing work can be categorized
according to the techniques they employ to find vulnerabilities:
symbolic execution [9], [14], [27], [28], [29], static-analysis
based approaches [30] and formal verification [10], [11]. Our
approach works at the EVM-level and is based on static
analysis and symbolic execution, and is thus closely related
to the following work.
Oyente [9] is the first tool to apply symbolic execution
to find potential security bugs in smart contracts. Oyente
formulates the security bugs as intra-procedural properties and
uses symbolic execution to check these properties. Among
19,366 existing Ethereum contracts, Oyente flags 8, 833 of
them as vulnerable, including the vulnerability responsible
for the DAO attack. However, Oyente does not perform
inter-procedural analyses to check inter-procedural or trace
properties as did in sCompile.
MAIAN [14] is recently developed to find three types
of problematic contracts in the wild: prodigal, greedy and
suicidal. It formulates the three types of problems as inter-
procedural properties and performs bounded inter-procedural
symbolic execution. It also builds a private testnet to valid
whether the contracts found by it are true positives by execut-
ing the contracts with data generated by symbolic execution.
In the high-level, both MAIAN and sCompile perform inter-
procedural symbolic analyses and check the suicidal and
greedy contracts. However, sCompile differs from MAIAN in
the following aspects. First, sCompile makes a much more
conservative assumption about a call to third-party contract
which we assume can call back a function in current contract.
sCompile is designed to reduce user effort rather than to
analyze smart contracts fully automatically. Therefore sCom-
pile focuses on ranking program paths in terms of their
criticalness and only applies symbolic execution to selected
few critical program paths. Secondly, sCompile supports more
properties than MAIAN. Thirdly, sCompile checks properties
in ways which are different from MAIAN. For instance, to
check for black hole contracts, MAIAN checks whether a
contract can receive Ether through testing (e.g., by sending
Ether to the contract). As showed in Section II, the result is that
there may be false negatives. Other symbolic execution based
tools [27], [28] perform intra-procedural symbolic analysis
directly on the EVM bytecode as what Oyente does.
The tool Securify [30] is based on static analysis to an-
alyze contracts. It infers semantic information about control
dependencies and data dependencies from the CFG of an
intermediate language for EVM bytecode. Then it specifies
both compliance and violation patterns for the property. The
vulnerability detection problem is then reduced to search the
patterns on the inferred data and control dependencies infor-
mation. The use of compliance pattern reduces the number of
false positives in the reported warnings. Our approach does not
infer semantic information from CFG, instead in the ranking
algorithm, we rely on syntactic information to reduce paths for
further symbolic analysis to improve performance. We analyze
the extracted paths with symbolic execution which is more
precise than the pure static analysis as adopted by Securify.
In addition, static analysis based tools such as those pro-
vided in Solidity compiler and Remix IDE [31] can perform
checks on the Solidity source code to find common program-
ming anti-patterns and cannot find the properties proposed in
this work.
Besides symbolic execution, there are attempts on formal
verification of smart contracts using either model-checking
techniques [10] or theorem-proving approaches [11]. These
approaches in theory can check arbitrary properties specified
manually in a form accepted by the model checker or the
theorem prover. It is known that model checking has limited
scalability whereas theorem proving requires an overwhelming
amount of user effort.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we introduce an approach to reveal “money-
related“ vulnerabilities in smart contract by identifying a small
number of critical paths for user inspection. The critical paths
are identified and ranked so that the effort required on applying
symbolic execution techniques or user inspection is mini-
mized. We implemented the approach in the tool sCompile.
We show that sCompile can effectively and efficiently analyze
smart contracts. In addition, with sCompile, we find 224 new
vulnerabilities. All the new vulnerabilities are well defined
in our approach and could be presented to the user in well-
organized information within a reasonable time frame. In
the future, we plan to further develop sCompile to improve
its efficiency and effectiveness (with techniques like loop-
invariant synthesis).
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